Recks

Aye.

Aye.

Mr. President pro tempore, 

 

I appreciate the swift response to the terrible terrorist incident in Oregon. Evidently, even the agitations of the environmentalist agenda have gone too far. Terrorism is never acceptable, and I hope the entire Senate agrees with me that the rhetoric and ideology that motivated such acts of ecoterrorism is unacceptable.

 

This is a good bill, Mr. President pro tempore, but I would point out that in the haste to resurrect an old proposal, the sponsor, the Senator from Oregon, failed to make a necessary update that would allow the spending of funds in the current and near-term fiscal years. That is why I offer the following amendment to Section 5(i):

25 minutes ago, Brady said:

(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009 2022 through 2026 such sums as are necessary to carry out this section.

 

 

I yield.

Mr. President pro tempore,

 

While some may question the importance of the federal government getting involved in the local affairs of our schools, I believe that is a debate for another day. For now, I would like to speak to the contents of the bill as it stands now. 

 

I would point out that, as indicated in the findings, bullying is a problem that impacts a multitude of students - not simply students who believe themselves to be homosexual or transgendered. However, when you look at the membership, this bill would require state education agencies to include on their taskforce a member who is a representative of the LGBTQ community. I believe that, to the extent that the federal government mandates who needs to serve on the committee, we should focus on representatives of the broader student support movement. A school superintendent could then choose who to place on the task force. Therefore, I move to amend subsection (c)(2) of the newly proposed section 8549D as follows:

15 minutes ago, Brady said:

“(2) COMPOSITION.—Each State shall designate at least one individual from each of the following categories to serve on the task force of such State:

“(A) At least one teacher at elementary schools and secondary schools selected in consultation with the union or association representing educators.

“(B) At least one school administrator.

“(C) At least one parent of students.

“(D) At least one K–12 student.

“(E) At least one guidance counselor.

“(F) At least one child psychologist.

“(G) At least one school psychologist.

“(H) At least one paraprofessional.

“(I) At least one lawyer.

“(J) At least one representative from a community-based organization who specializes in providing supportive services to students who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer.

“(K) Professionals who specialize in providing support services to students who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer.

“(L) At least one individual from the Sate Education Agency office focused on school improvement and school climate.

“(M) Additional individuals, as determined by the chair of the task force.

 

I would note that subitem (K) is also quite repetitive of subitem (J) as it previously stood, and there is no number requirement on item (K), so it is probably best to clear that part up either way.

 

Additionally, I move to amend subsection (c)(2)(A) to remove the reference to required consultation with teachers' unions. I would point out that there may be multiple associations or unions that claim to represent teachers, and that this would give grounds for a union to sue a state if the consultation does not result in a pick that the union likes.

22 minutes ago, Brady said:

“(A) At least one teacher at elementary schools and secondary schools selected in consultation with the union or association representing educators.

 

Finally for now, I move to amend subsection (c)(2)(M) to allow the State's Chief Education Officer, rather than the chair of the task force, to select the additional individuals. I believe this is a commonsense move which should be noncontroversial.

23 minutes ago, Brady said:

“(M) Additional individuals, as determined by the chair of the task force Chief Education Officer of the State.

 

For now, I yield.

Mr. President pro tempore,

 

I believe that, if we are to re-write employment law as this bill purports to do, we should have a fully informed conversation. I will oppose any rushed motions for cloture on this measure, because we should fully vet and feel out the implications such a bill would have. One area that I believe needs fixed in this bill is to prevent it from applying to previously-entered contracts. These contracts would have been freely-entered and, under this bill, we would have the federal government insert itself without giving either party necessary recompense for the possible future breach of contract by the other party.

 

That is why, as my first proposal, I move to amend Section 5 to read:

11 minutes ago, Brady said:

SEC. 5. APPLICABILITY.

This Act shall apply with respect to a claim that is filed under Federal, State, or Tribal law any contract or agreement that is entered into on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

 

I yield.

Mr. President pro tempore,

 

I rise to make two amendments, without which I would feel hard-pressed to support this bill.

 

First, I believe that allowing a carve-out for collective bargaining agreements is a slap in the face to the millions of Americans who choose not to be unionized. What message is being sent when the bills' proponent attempts to hide and disguise sexual assault just because a union contract says so? In the effort to make this apply to all workplaces, I move to strike: 

5 minutes ago, Brady said:

“(c) Exception For Collective Bargaining Agreements.—Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in a contract between an employer and a labor organization or between labor organizations, except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a right arising under provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom.”.

 

Second, this bill applies to agreements that are already in place, which I believe violates the inherent and fundamental right to contract more than is necessary. With that in mind, I move to amend Section 3 to read:

6 minutes ago, Brady said:

SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues contract or agreement entered into on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

 

I yield.

The following five bills are to be placed on the Floor of the U.S. House of Representatives:

• The Unborn Child Financial Services Act
• Workforce Pell Act of 2021
• Education Savings Act of 2021
• America Works Act
• Counter Chinese Community Party Influence Act

 

@Tuna

 

@Richard

Docket of the U.S. House of Representatives

 

 

Pursuant to the AB's announcement, the Senate Republican Leader may docket up to 10 bills per in-game year for consideration by the House.

Please number as S.11.

IN SENATE

 

Sen. FISK (for himself, Sen. VALKENBURG, Sen. SCHMITZ, Sen. EDEN, Sen. BU, Sen. VALDEZ, and Sen. HURST, with thanks cited throughout) introduced the following bill;

 

A BILL

 

To counter malign foreign influence by the Chinese Communist Party around the globe, and for other purposes.

 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Counter Chinese Communist Party Influence Act”.

 

SECTION 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The Table of Contents for this Act is as follows:

1. Short title.

2. Table of contents.

Title I - De-Platforming the Chinese Communist Party

101. Communist Chinese recruitment programs and designated foreign missions.

102. Social media reciprocity requirements.

103. Chinese state media accountability.

104. Federal lobbying prohibitions.

105. Federal devices prohibition.

Title II - Sanctioning Malign CCP Influences

201. Sense of Congress.

202. Sanctions against Uyghur genocide.

203. Sanctions against illegal island construction.

204. Sanctions against election interference.

205. Sanctions against members of the National Congress of the CCP.

Title III - Preventing Financial Influence 

301. CCP securities disclosures.

302. Chinese currency at the International Monetary Fund.

303. Strategic Petroleum Reserve sales conditions.

Title IV - Ending Tax Breaks for China

401. Repeal of reduced withholding for residents of China.

402. Taxation of China-held debt obligations.

 

TITLE I - DE-PLATFORMING THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

SECTION 101. COMMUNIST CHINESE RECRUITMENT PROGRAMS AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN MISSIONS.

(with thanks to Mr. Murphy of Wisconsin)

(a) DEFINITIONS.--For the purpose of this Section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) COMMUNIST CHINESE RECRUITMENT PROGRAM.--“Communist Chinese recruitment program” means a program established by the government of China, including the Thousand Talents Program, the Overseas High-Level Talent Recruitment Program, and the National High-End Foreign Experts Recruitment Plan, to recruit or partner with scientists, scholars, and other experts by offering them benefits or privileges, such as concurrent or short-term appointments at Chinese institutions or Chinese research laboratories.

(2) DESIGNATED FOREIGN MISSION.--"Designated foreign mission" means any entity or operation designated by the Office of Foreign Missions in the State Department as a foreign mission, as defined in 22 USC 4302 (a), of the People's Republic of China within the United States, including the Confucius Institute U.S. Center, the Asia Society Chinese Language Partner Network, the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, and the Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation.

(3) GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.--“Government of China” means any of the following:

(A) The Communist Party of China.
(B) The People's Republic of China or any governmental unit of the People's Republic of China or of a province, region, or other political subdivision of the People's Republic of China.
(C) Any instrumentality of the People's Republic of China or of the Communist Party of China.

(3) PARTICIPATE.--“Participate” means a person's entering into a written agreement with a Chinese institution, Chinese research laboratory, or the government of China that confers upon the person benefits or privileges associated with, or membership in, a Communist Chinese recruitment program.

(4) SCHOOL.--"School" means both:

(A) Any institute of higher education that receives federal funding or enrolls students that received federal financial aid.

(B) Any public district or public charter school, whether elementary or secondary, that receives funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

(b) PROHIBITION.--Upon the date of enactment of this Section:

(1) No school or system of schools shall permit the operation or recognition of a designated foreign mission or a Communist Chinese recruitment program; and

(2) No student, faculty, staff or other individual affiliated with any school or system of schools may participate with the programs of a designated foreign mission or a Communist Chinese recruitment program.

(c) EXISTING FOREIGN MISSIONS.--Within twelve months of the enactment of this Section, the head of each institute of higher education and each State's system of schools must submit a report on the existence of designated foreign missions and Communist Chinese recruitment programs under their purview. The State Department shall provide technical assistance in identifying designated foreign missions and Communist Chinese recruitment programs. Within six months of the report's submission, action must be taken to remove recognition, operation or ability to participate in a designated foreign mission or Communist Chinese recruitment program.

(d) DISCLOSURE.--Any student, faculty, staff or other individual affiliated with any school or system of schools who has participated in the programs of a designated foreign mission or a Communist Chinese recruitment program shall disclose their involvement to the Department of Education, by way of the head of the respective institute of higher education or their State's system of schools. In disclosing involvement to the Department of Education, the individual shall provide a complete copy of any related contract any any contacts located within the People's Republic of China. The Department of Justice must maintain confidentiality of such disclosures, except that the Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security may request access on an individual, case-by-case basis.

 

SECTION 102. SOCIAL MEDIA RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENTS.

Social media platforms that operate in the United States may not allow Chinese state-run media organizations, the agents of such an organization, or officials from the People's Republic of China, Chinese Community Party or People's Liberation Army to post on their platform unless the social media platform certifies to the Secretary of State that the platform is not blocked or otherwise restricted in the People's Republic of China to a greater extent than it is in the United States. 

 

SECTION 103. CHINESE STATE MEDIA ACCOUNTABILITY.

(with thanks to Sen. Scott of Florida)

(a) Defined Term.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section, the term “Chinese state-run media organization” includes—

(A) China Central Television;

(B) China News Service;

(C) the People’s Daily;

(D) the Global Times;

(E) Xinhua News Agency;

(F) China Global Television Network;

(G) China Radio International;

(H) China Daily Distribution Corporation; and

(I) Hai Tian Development USA.

(2) IDENTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL CHINESE STATE-RUN MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS.—The Secretary of State shall determine whether any media organization not listed under paragraph (1)—

(A) is a Chinese state-run media organization; and

(B) is subject to the visa restrictions set forth in this section.

(b) Report On Chinese Journalists In The United States.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress that identifies the number of nationals of the People’s Republic of China—

(1) who are engaged in the journalism profession;

(2) and:

(A) who are employed by a Chinese state-run media organization; or

(B) whose work product, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, is effectively controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party;

(3) who, during the most recent 1-year period—

(A) were issued a nonimmigrant visa under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)) (commonly known as an “H–1B visa”) or were granted an extension for such visa;

(B) were issued a nonimmigrant visa under section 101(a)(15)(I) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(I)) (commonly known as an “I–1 visa”) or were granted an extension for such visa; or

(C) were issued a nonimmigrant visa under section 101(a)(15)(L) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L)) (commonly known as an “L–1 visa”) or were granted an extension for such visa; and

(4) who were physically present in the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) Review Of Certain Nonimmigrant Visa Holders.—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services may not approve a petition for a nonimmigrant visa referred to in subsection (b)(3) to any journalist from the People’s Republic of China described in subsection (b)(2), and the Bureau of Consular Affairs may not issue such a visa to any such journalist, until after the Secretary of State submits the report required under subsection (b).

(d) Additional Requirements For Certain Nonimmigrant Visas.—Before issuing a nonimmigrant visa referred to in subsection (b)(3) to a journalist from the People’s Republic of China described in subsection (b)(2), the Bureau of Consular Affairs shall ensure that—

(1) the number of nonimmigrant visas issued to journalists from the People’s Republic of China described in subsection (b)(2) does not exceed the number of United States journalists in the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) such visa is valid for a period not to exceed 90 days.

(e) Renewals.—A nonimmigrant visa issued to a journalist from the People’s Republic of China described in subsection (b)(2) may be renewed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for an additional 90-day period if the number of valid nonimmigrant visas issued to Chinese journalists described in subsection (b)(2) is fewer than the number of United States journalists in the People’s Republic of China.

 

SECTION 104. FEDERAL LOBBYING PROHIBITIONS.

(with thanks to Sen. Sasse and Mr. Johnson of Louisiana)

(a) Presidential Appointees.—Section 207 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(m) Restrictions On Presidential Appointees With Respect To The Government Of The People’s Republic Of China, The Chinese Communist Party, And Chinese Military Companies.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to the other restrictions set forth in this section, any person who serves in a position pursuant to an appointment made by the President and who knowingly, at any time after the termination of his or her service in the position—

“(A) represents an entity described in paragraph (2) before any officer or employee of any department or agency of the United States with the intent to influence a decision of such officer or employee in carrying out his or her official duties; or

“(B) aids or advises an entity described in paragraph (2) with the intent to influence a decision of any officer or employee of any department or agency of the United States, in carrying out his or her official duties,

shall be punished as provided in section 216 of this title.

“(2) ENTITIES.—An entity described in this paragraph is any of the following:

“(A) The Government of the People’s Republic of China.

“(B) The Chinese Communist Party.

“(C) Any entity identified under section 1237(b) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105–261; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

“(D) Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a Chinese military company.

“(E) An entity based in the People's Republic of China that is included on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.”.

(b) Former Members of Congress.—The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 5 the following new section:

“SEC. 5A. PROHIBITING LOBBYING CONTACTS BY FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON BEHALF OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

“(a) Prohibition.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a former Member of Congress may not make a lobbying contact under this Act, or any communication which would be a lobbying contact under this Act if it were not disclosed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.), on behalf of a client which, at the time of the lobbying contact or communication, is a Communist country or an entity owned or controlled by a Communist country.

“(b) Penalty.—In addition to any other penalty under this Act, any person who violates subsection (a) shall be subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 for each such violation.

“(c) Definition.—In this section, a ‘Communist country’ means a country which is treated as a Communist country under section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)).”.

(c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to lobbying contacts under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 which are made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

SECTION 105. FEDERAL DEVICES PROHIBITION.

(with inspiration from Sen. Hawley)

(a) Definitions.—In this section—

(1) the term “covered application” means any application or service developed in the People's Republic of China or by a company based in the People's Republic of China, including:

(A) TikTok or any successor application or service;

(B) WeChat or any successor application or service;

(C) Other social networking services.

(2) the term “executive agency” has the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code; and

(3) the term “information technology” has the meaning given that term in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code.

(b) Prohibition On The Use Of Covered Applications.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and consistent with the information security requirements under subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, shall develop standards and guidelines for executive agencies requiring the removal of any covered application from information technology.

(2) NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH EXCEPTIONS.—The standards and guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) exceptions for law enforcement activities, national security interests and activities, and security researchers; and

(B) for any authorized use of a covered application under an exception, requirements for agencies to develop and document risk mitigation actions for such use.

 

TITLE II - SANCTIONING MALIGN CCP INFLUENCES

SECTION 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND SANCTIONS.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio for subsections b through h)

(a) It is the sense of Congress that the Chinese Communist Party has committed numerous human rights violations against the people of Hong Kong and the people of Taiwan, genocide against Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, illegal construction of islands in foreign and international waters, and illegal foreign interference in other sovereign nations' democratic practices.

(b) The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person identified in the reports required under Sections 202, 203, 204 or 205 of this Act.

(c) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this section are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under Sections 202, 203, 204 or 205 of this Act if such property and interests in property—

(A) are in the United States;

(B) come within the United States; or

(C) come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in Sections 202, 203, 204 or 205 of this Act is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(3) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.

(d) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(e) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person identified in the report required under Sections 202, 203, 204 or 205 of this Act if the President determines and certifies to Congress that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(f) Exceptions.—

(1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(g) Termination Of Sanctions.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person if the President determines and reports to Congress not later than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—

(1) information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity described in Sections 202, 203, 204 or 205 of this Act in the future; or

(4) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.

(h) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

 

SECTION 202. SANCTIONS AGAINST UYGHUR GENOCIDE.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio)

(a) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that identifies each foreign person, including any official of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, that the President determines is responsible for any of the following with respect to Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, members of other Muslim minority groups, or other persons in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:

(1) Torture.

(2) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

(3) Prolonged detention without charges and trial.

(4) Causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons.

(5) Other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

 

SECTION 203. SANCTIONS AGAINST ILLEGAL ISLAND CONSTRUCTION.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio)

(a) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that identifies any Chinese person, including any senior official of the Government of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines:

(1) is responsible for or significantly contributes to large-scale reclamation, construction, militarization, or ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas of the South China Sea;

(2) is responsible for or significantly contributes to, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, including the use of coercion, to inhibit another country from protecting its sovereign rights to access offshore resources in the South China Sea, including in such country’s exclusive economic zone, consistent with such country’s rights and obligations under international law;

(3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that significantly threaten the peace, security, or stability of disputed areas of the South China Sea or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels and aircraft by the People’s Republic of China to occupy or conduct extensive research or drilling activity in those areas;

(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or

(5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

 

SECTION 204. SANCTIONS AGAINST ELECTION INTERFERENCE.

(with thanks to Mr. Banks)

(a) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that identifies any foreign person that the President determines knowingly commits a significant act of malign disinformation on behalf of the government of a foreign country or foreign political party that has the direct purpose or effect of influencing political, diplomatic, or educational activities in the United States or an allied nation for the purpose of harming:

(1) the national security or defense of the United States or an allied nation; or

(2) the safety and security of any United States citizen or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

 

SECTION 205. SANCTIONS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CCP.

(with thanks to Mrs. McLain)

(a) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that identifies:

(1) a person who is or was a member of any National Communist Party Congress of the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) any person who is an adult family member, including a spouse or adult family member, of a person described in paragraph (1).

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

 

TITLE III - PREVENTING FINANICAL INFLUENCE 

SECTION 301. CCP SECURITIES DISCLOSURES.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio)

(a) Definitions.—In this section—

(1) the term “Commission” means the Securities and Exchange Commission;

(2) the term “covered issuer” means an issuer, including a foreign private issuer, that is required to file annual reports with the Commission under section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a));

(3) the term “issuer” has the meaning given the term in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a));

(4) the term “joint venture partner”, with respect to a covered issuer, means—

(A) a joint venture in which the covered issuer, or a subsidiary with respect to the covered issuer, is a party; or

(B) any other person that is a party in a joint venture described in subparagraph (A); and

(5) the term “subsidiary”, with respect to a covered issuer, means a wholly or partially owned subsidiary of the covered issuer.

(b) Requirement.—Each covered issuer, in each annual report that the covered issuer files with the Commission (beginning with the second annual report that the covered issuer files with the Commission after the date of enactment of this Act), shall—

(1) disclose whether the covered issuer, or any subsidiary or joint venture partner with respect to the covered issuer, has established or maintained an organization of the Chinese Communist Party during the period covered by the report;

(2) if an organization of the Chinese Communist Party has participated in the operations of the covered issuer, or of any subsidiary or joint venture partner with respect to the covered issuer, during the period covered by the report, summarize that participation; and

(3) disclose whether the board of directors of the covered issuer (or the equivalent body with respect to the covered issuer), under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the covered issuer is incorporated or otherwise organized—

(A) owes a fiduciary duty to the covered issuer and shareholders of the covered issuer; and

(B) is subject to heightened scrutiny with respect to conflicted controller transactions.

(c) Updates To Rules.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall make any updates to the rules of the Commission that are necessary as a result of this section.

 

SECTION 302. CHINESE CURRENCY AT THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

(with thanks to Mr. Banks)

(a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate a written report which includes a certification that—

(1) the People’s Republic of China is in compliance with all its obligations under Article VIII of the 19 Articles of Agreement of the Fund;

(2) in the preceding 12 months, there has not been a report submitted under section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 or section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 in which the People’s Republic of China has been found to have manipulated its currency;

(3) the People’s Republic of China has instituted and is implementing the policies and practices necessary to ensure that the renminbi is freely usable (within the meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund); and

(4) the People’s Republic of China adheres to the rules and principles of the Paris Club and the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.

(b) In General.—The United States Governor of the International Monetary Fund (in this subsection referred to as the “Fund”) shall use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose, and may not consent to, an increase in the quota of the People’s Republic of China in the Fund, unless the Secretary of the Treasury reports to the Congress that—

(1) the Board of Governors of the Fund is considering admission of Taiwan as a member of the Fund, pursuant to the recommendation of the Board of Executive Directors of the Fund; or

(2) Taiwan enjoys meaningful participation in the Fund, including through—

(A) participation in regular surveillance activities of the Fund with respect to the economic and financial policies of Taiwan, consistent with Article IV consultation procedures of the Fund;

(B) employment opportunities for Taiwan nationals, without regard to any consideration that, in the determination of the Secretary, does not generally restrict the employment of nationals of member countries of the Fund; and

(C) the ability to receive appropriate technical assistance and training by the Fund.

(c) Waiver.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive subsection (b) of this section with respect to a proposal on reporting to the Congress that providing the waiver will substantially promote the objective of securing more equitable treatment of Taiwan at each international financial institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act).

 

SECTION 303. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE SALES CONDITIONS.

(with thanks to Sen. Cruz)

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) BIDDER.—The term “bidder” means an individual or entity bidding or intending to bid at an auction of crude oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

(2) SECRETARY.—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Energy.

(3) STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE.—The term “Strategic Petroleum Reserve” means the Strategic Petroleum Reserve established under part B of title I of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6231 et seq.).

(b) Prohibition On Export Of SPR Crude Oil To Certain Countries.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 161 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6241), and subject to paragraph (2), with respect to the drawdown and sale at auction of any crude oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall require, as a condition of any such sale, that the crude oil not be exported to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) WAIVER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—On application by a bidder, the Secretary may waive, prior to the date of the applicable auction, the condition described in paragraph (1) with respect to the sale of crude oil to that bidder at that auction.

(B) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary may issue a waiver under subparagraph (A) only if the Secretary determines that the waiver is in the interest of the national security of the United States.

(C) APPLICATIONS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—A bidder desiring a waiver under subparagraph (A) shall submit to the Secretary an application—

(I) not later than the date that is 30 days before the date of the applicable auction; and

(II) in such form and containing such information as the Secretary may require.

(ii) DEADLINE FOR DECISION.—The Secretary shall determine whether to approve or deny an application submitted under clause (i) by the date that is 30 days after the date on which the application is submitted.

(c) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources of the House of Representatives a report describing—

(1) the route to destination and place of refinement of all crude oil sold at auction from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve since January 1, 2021; and

(2) the ownership of the refinement facilities at which crude oil described in paragraph (1) was refined.

 

TITLE IV - ENDING TAX BREAKS FOR CHINA

 

SECTION 401. REPEAL OF REDUCED WITHHOLDING FOR RESIDENTS OF CHINA.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio)

(a) In General.—Section 894 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—

(1) by striking “The provisions of” in subsection (a) and inserting “Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of”, and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) Exception For People's Republic Of China.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The rates of tax imposed under sections 871 and 881, and the rates of withholding tax imposed under chapter 3, with respect to any resident of the People's Republic of China shall be determined without regard to any provision of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Beijing on April 30, 1984.

“(2) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this subsection through the use of foreign entities.”.

(b) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to income received after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

SECTION 402. TAXATION OF CHINA-HELD DEBT OBLIGATIONS.

(with thanks to Sen. Rubio)

(a) In General.—Section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(c) Exception.—This section shall not apply to the Government of the People's Republic of China.”.

(b) Central Bank.—Section 895 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended—

(1) by striking “Income” and inserting the following:

“(a) In General.—Income”, and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(b) Exception.—This section shall not apply to the any central bank of the People's Republic of China.”.

(c) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to income received or derived after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

TITLE V - UYGHUR FORCED LABOR PREVENTION

With thanks to Mr. McGovern and Mr. Smith

 

SECTION 501. SHORT TITLE.

This Title may be cited as the “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act”.

 

SEC. 502. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has established a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps arbitrarily detaining as many as 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups who have been subjected to forced labor, torture, political indoctrination, and severe human rights abuses.

(2) Forced labor exists within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s system of mass internment camps, and throughout the region, and is confirmed by the testimony of former camp detainees, satellite imagery, and official leaked documents from the government of the People’s Republic of China as part of a targeted campaign of repression of Muslim ethnic minorities.

(3) There is a very high risk that many factories and other suppliers in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are exploiting forced labor according to reports from researchers, media, and civil society groups. Audits to vet products and supply chains in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are not possible due to the extent forced labor has contaminated the regional economy, the mixing of involuntary labor with voluntary labor, the inability of witnesses to speak freely about working conditions given heavy government surveillance and coercion, and the strong incentive of government officials to conceal government-sponsored forced labor.

(4) In its June 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, the Department of State found that “Authorities offer subsidies incentivizing Chinese companies to open factories in close proximity to the internment camps, and local governments receive additional funds for each inmate forced to work in these sites at a fraction of minimum wage or without any compensation.”.

(5) In September 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a “Withhold Release Order” on garments produced by Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd. due to “suspected prison or forced labor” from its factories in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(6) In its 2019 Annual Report, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) found that products reportedly produced with forced labor by current and former mass internment camp detainees included textiles, electronics, food products, shoes, tea, and handicrafts.

(7) According to public reports, the following companies are or have been suspected of directly employing forced labor or sourcing from suppliers that are suspected of using forced labor: Adidas, Badger Sportswear, Calvin Klein, Campbell Soup Company, Coca-Cola Company, COFCO Tunhe Company, Costco, Esquel Group, Esprit, H&M, Hetian Taida, Huafu Fashion Company, Kraft Heinz Company, Litai Textiles, Nike, Inc., Patagonia, Inc., Tommy Hilfiger, Urumqi Shengshi Huaer Culture Technology Company, Yili Zhuo Wan Garment Manufacturing Company, and Zhihui Haipai Internet of Things Technology Company.

(8) Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) states that it is illegal to import into the United States “goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” by forced labor. Such merchandise is subject to exclusion or seizure and may lead to criminal investigation of the importer.

(9) The policies of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are in contravention of international human rights standards, including—

(A) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed but not yet ratified;

(B) the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ratified by the People’s Republic of China in 2001; and

(C) the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol), to which China is a state party.

 

SEC. 503. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the People’s Republic of China and particularly any such goods, wares, article, or merchandise produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(2) to encourage the international community to reduce the import of any goods made with forced labor from China, particularly those goods mined, manufactured, or produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(3) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a modern form of slavery;

(4) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its national interest, including efforts to prevent torture, enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and

(5) to address gross violations of human rights in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions where both the United States and China are members and with all the authorities available to the United States Government, including visa and financial sanctions, export restrictions, and import controls.

 

SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) In General.—Except as provided in subsection (b), all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, or by persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government for purposes of the “poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-assistance” program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, shall be deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States.

(b) Exception.—The prohibition described in subsection (a) shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection—

(1) determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any specific goods, wares, articles, or merchandise described in subsection (a) were not produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees and makes available to the public a report that contains such determination.

(c) Effective Date.—This section shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

SEC. 505. DETERMINATION RELATING TO ATROCITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall—

(1) determine if forced labor being carried out against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China is systematic and widespread and therefore constitutes atrocities; and

(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to the public a report that contains such determination.

(b) Form.—The report required by subsection (a)—

(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, if necessary; and

(2) may be included in the report required by section 6.

 

SEC. 506. STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a United States strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international awareness of and to address the forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

(b) Matters To Be Included.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral outreach, including sustained engagement with the governments of United States partners and allies, to end the forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(2) public affairs and public diplomacy campaigns, including options to work with news organizations and media outlets to publish opinion pieces and secure public speaking opportunities for United States Government officials on issues related to the human rights situation, including forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and

(3) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private sector entities to raise awareness about forced labor made products from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups, including those formerly detained in mass internment camps in the region.

(c) Additional Matters To Be Included.—The report required by subsection (a) shall also include—

(1) a list of—

(A) Chinese entities or affiliates of entities that directly or indirectly use forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and

(B) Chinese persons that acted as agents of the entities or affiliates of entities described in subparagraph (A) to import goods into the United States;

(2) a list of products made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(3) a list of businesses that sold products in the United States made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and

(4) a description of actions taken by the United States Government to address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under existing authorities, including—

(A) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

(B) section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307);

(C) the Ellie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and

(D) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(d) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(e) Updates.—The Secretary of State shall—

(1) provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on a quarterly basis, as applicable, on any updates to the strategy required by subsection (a) or any additional actions taken to address forced labor in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, including actions described in this Act; and

(2) include any updates to the strategy required by subsection (a) in the annual Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).

(f) Sunset.—This section shall cease to have effect on the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that the Government of the People’s Republic of China has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other gross violations of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

 

SEC. 507. REPORT ON “WITHHOLD RELEASE ORDERS” PURSUANT TO SECTION 307 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930.

(a) In General.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report including a determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist, and an explanation of the reasons for any conclusion that such grounds do not exist, to issue a “Withhold Release Order” pursuant to section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) with respect to products of each of the following:

(1) Yili Zhou Wan Garment Manufacturing Company.

(2) Zhihui Haipai Internet of Things Technology Company.

(3) Urumqi Shengshi Hua’er Culture Technology Limited Company.

(4) Litai Textiles, Huafu Fashion Company.

(5) Esquel Group headquartered in Hong Kong.

(6) Cofco Tunhe Company.

(b) Form.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

 

SEC. 508. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) Policy Statement.—It is the policy of the United States to protect American investors, though stronger disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of human rights in United States capital markets, including American and foreign companies listed on United States exchanges that enable the mass internment and population surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities and source products made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China. Such involvements represent clear, material risks to the share values and corporate reputations of certain of these companies and hence to prospective American investors, particularly given that the United States Government has employed sanctions and export restrictions to target individuals and entities contributing to human rights abuses in China.

(b) Disclosure Of Certain Activities Relating To The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(s) Disclosure Of Certain Activities Relating To The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—

“(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in creating or providing technology or other assistance to create mass population surveillance systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, including any entity included on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Entity List’ in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

“(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity building and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

“(C) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or otherwise acquired significant types or amounts of textiles made from material produced or manufactured in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

“(D) knowingly engaged in an activity with an entity or an affiliate of an entity described in section 6(c)(1) of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, including—

“(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pairing-assistance’ program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; or

“(ii) any entity for which the Department of Homeland Security has issued a ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or

“(E) knowingly conducted any transaction or had dealings with—

“(i) any person the property and interests in property of which were sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the detention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

“(ii) any person the property and interests in property of which are sanctioned pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or

“(iii) any person or entity responsible for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

“(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—If an issuer described under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in paragraph (1), the issuer required under this paragraph is a detailed description of each such activity, including—

“(A) the nature and extent of the activity;

“(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and

“(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue the activity.

“(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report that identifies the issuer and contains the information required by paragraph (2).

“(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.—Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission shall promptly—

“(A) transmit the report to—

“(i) the President;

“(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

“(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and the notice available to the public by posting the information on the Internet website of the Commission.

“(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph (1), the President shall—

“(A) make a determination with respect to whether any investigation is needed into the possible imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 7 of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or whether criminal investigations are warranted under statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or entities involved in the importation of goods produced by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and

“(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any such investigation, make a determination with respect to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).”.

(c) Sunset.—On the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the determination described in section 6(f), section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b), is repealed.

(d) Effective Date.—The amendment made by subsection (b) shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

SEC. 509. TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RELATING TO AWARENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

With thanks to Mr. Peters and Ms. Lummis

(a) In General.—The Secretary of Commerce shall provide training described in subsection (b) to such employees of the Department of Commerce who provide counseling services to businesses engaged in interstate commerce or foreign direct investment as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(b) Contents Of Training.—The training required under subsection (a) shall be—

(1) designed to raise awareness about emerging trends and issues with respect to human rights abuses occurring worldwide, such as human rights abuses perpetrated by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including the use of forced labor, against Uyghurs and other ethnic minority populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and

(2) incorporated to the greatest extent possible into existing training provided by the Department of Commerce.

(c) Timing.—The training required under subsection (a) shall be offered and updated at such times as the Secretary considers appropriate.

 

SEC. 510. GUIDANCE FOR BUSINESSES RELATING TO AWARENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

With thanks to Mr. Peters and Ms. Lummis

(a) In General.—The Secretary of Commerce shall—

(1) offer guidance for United States businesses engaged in interstate commerce or foreign direct investment, including such businesses that are, or are considering, conducting transactions with entities subject to the control or influence of jurisdictions where significant human rights abuses have occurred, such as the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) incorporate the guidance required under paragraph (1) into any counseling services that the Department of Commerce provides to such businesses as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(b) Contents Of Guidance.—The guidance required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide information about emerging trends and issues involving human rights abuses, such as information that describes—

(A) human rights abuses perpetrated by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including the use of forced labor, against Uyghurs and other ethnic minority populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;

(B) risk factors that may be used to identify entities subject to the influence or control of jurisdictions such as the People’s Republic of China that may be implicated in human rights abuses;

(C) ways to avoid doing business with entities described in subparagraph (B); and

(D) potential reputational, economic, legal, and other risks of conducting transactions with an entity described in subparagraph (B); and

(2) make clear that the guidance is for advisory purposes and that the Department of Commerce is not responsible for certifying the accuracy or completeness of the information provided in the guidance.

 

SEC. 511. DEFINITIONS.

In this Title:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking.

(2) ATROCITIES.—The term “atrocities” has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(3) FORCED LABOR.—The term “forced labor” has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).

(4) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(5) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM.—The term “mass population surveillance system” means installation and integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial intelligence technology with the “Sharp Eyes” and “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” or other technologies that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and big-data predictive policing.

 

 TITLE VI - ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS

With thanks to Mr. Menendez

 

SECTION 601. SHORT TITLE.
This Title  may be cited as the “Advancing Competitiveness, Transparency, and Security in the Americas Act”.

 

SEC. 602. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean since 2004. Latin America is the second largest destination for Chinese foreign direct investment. China has become the top trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. China’s trade with Latin America has grown from $17,000,000,000 in 2002 to $306,000,000,000 in 2018.

(2) Between 2005 and 2018, the People’s Republic of China provided Latin America with an estimated $141,000,000,000 in development loans and other assistance. The annual amount of such loans and assistance consistently surpasses the annual sovereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean from either the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank.

(3) The People’s Republic of China—

(A) is investing extensively across the region’s extractive sector and agricultural supply chains to more effectively control raw materials supply and pricing;

(B) has acquired and built new port facilities and other transport and energy infrastructure in Brazil, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and elsewhere in the region to expand its footprint in Latin America; and

(C) has developed strong partnerships and engaged in extensive deal-making in telecommunications and other technology-intensive sectors in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

(4) In 2015, the People’s Republic of China and countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held the first meeting of the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum, at which they agreed to a 5-year cooperation plan regarding politics, security, trade, investment, finance, infrastructure, energy, resources, industry, agriculture, science, and people-to-people exchanges. China is also active in other regional institutions, including multilateral development banks.

(5) The United States Southern Command has warned that China’s space and telecommunications ventures in Latin America and the Caribbean have created United States commercial and security vulnerabilities.

(6) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.

(7) China promotes the repressive use of technology—

(A) by selling crowd control weapons and riot gear used against demonstrators; and

(B) by developing tracking systems that can be used by governments to surveil and monitor their citizens.

(8) Although China did not originally include the Latin American and Caribbean region in its Belt and Road Initiative—

(A) at a meeting with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in January 2018, China invited Latin America and the Caribbean to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative, referring to the region as a natural fit for a program that aims to improve connectivity between land and sea through jointly built logistic, electricity, and information pathways; and

(B) 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries have signed bilateral Belt and Road Cooperation Agreements since 2017.

(9) The People’s Republic of China offers to finance projects in Latin America and the Caribbean on deceptively easy terms that frequently lead recipient countries to become dependent on, and deeply indebted to, China. Chinese companies frequently engage in exploitative practices, including predatory lending, and project requirements that—

(A) provide little or no benefit to the host country; and

(B) facilitate corrupt practices.

(10) The Government of China expects that Chinese companies will invest the equivalent of $250,000,000,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2025.

(11) Since 2017, China has used its increasing economic influence in Latin America and the Caribbean to encourage countries, including El Salvador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Of the 15 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 9 are in Latin America and the Caribbean, namely: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States shares extensive economic and commercial relations, democratic values, cultural ties, and geographic proximity with the nations of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) increased United States engagement with countries in the Western Hemisphere is essential to addressing initiatives by rival powers, such as China, to increase their presence and influence over governments in Latin American and the Caribbean at the expense of strategic economic and security interests of the United States;

(3) the United States is uniquely positioned to promote the rule of law and support the strengthening of democratic institutions and individual freedoms in Latin America and the Caribbean, while improving the quality of life of citizens throughout the Western Hemisphere;

(4) China’s growing presence in the Western Hemisphere—

(A) has contributed to the survival of autocratic and anti-democratic regimes, such as the Maduro regime and the Government of Cuba, by acting as a lender of last resort and providing other forms of economic support;

(B) has assisted such regimes in undermining democratic norms through weapons sales and the proliferation of surveillance technology; and

(C) has provided governments with the resources to implement irresponsible economic policies to the detriment of its citizens.

(5) the United States Government should continue to assert a positive presence in the Western Hemisphere based upon—

(A) supporting the rule of law, combating corruption, and advancing digital security as a means to improve prospects for regional growth and development and mitigate the unfair advantage accrued to those that engage in unfair and illegal practices;

(B) facilitating technical assistance and knowledge-sharing programs that strengthen regional governments’ and businesses’ capacity for engaging in sound negotiations and contracts, protect their economic interests, and protect the economic interests of their citizens;

(C) engaging in development investments that strengthen United States public and private sector ties to Western Hemisphere governments and businesses, promote shared conviction that open markets and fair competition are critical to sustained economic growth, enhance regional businesses’ ability to move up the value chain, and are environmentally sustainable;

(D) raising awareness regarding how the proliferation of Chinese economic largesse and the increased adoption of Chinese surveillance technology can harm Western Hemisphere economies and undermine democratic institutions;

(E) empowering local and international media and civil society to carefully monitor investment activity in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure accountability and uncover the malign effects of greater Chinese engagement, including a lack of transparency, facilitation of corruption, unsustainable debt, environmental damage, opaque labor and business practices of Chinese firms, and the increased likelihood of projects that leave host countries in unsustainable debt; and

(F) promoting greater economic engagement between the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere to spur economic development in the region and increase economic opportunities for the United States private sector.

SEC. 604. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to expand United States engagement in the Western Hemisphere through economic and public diplomacy that strengthens political and economic relations, reinforces shared democratic values, and facilitates economic development in the Western Hemisphere; and

(2) to promote United States economic prosperity through increased engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.

SEC. 605. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:

(1) CARIBBEAN.—The term “Caribbean” does not include Cuba, unless it is specifically named.

(2) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—The term “Latin America and the Caribbean” does not include Cuba, unless Cuba is specifically named.

(3) RULE OF LAW.—The term “rule of law” refers to a durable system of institutions and processes founded on the universal principles of—

(A) accountability;

(B) just laws that protect fundamental freedoms;

(C) open and transparent government processes; and

(D) accessible and impartial dispute resolution.

SEC. 606. ASSESSING THE INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
(a) Defined Term.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Reporting Requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of—

(1) Chinese economic activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as foreign direct investment, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, other preferential trading arrangements, and projects related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative;

(2) the involvement of Chinese government entities and state-owned enterprises in infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as—

(A) the building, renovating, and operating of port facilities, including the Margarita Port of Panama, Posorja Deepwater Port in Ecuador, and the Port of Paranaguá in Brazil;

(B) the building and maintenance of the region’s telecom infrastructure, including the bidding and construction of fiber optic submarine cables and the installation of 5G technologies, by Chinese companies, including Huawei, ZTE, and possibly others, and the likelihood that these companies will be the dominant providers of telecommunications infrastructure and associated products and services in the region, with great influence over Latin American government telecom entities;

(C) the building of government facilities in the region; and

(D) the building of Ecuador’s Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and other energy infrastructure projects in the region;

(3) Chinese military activity in the region, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as the major satellite and space control station China recently constructed in Argentina;

(4) Chinese security activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to regional governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Ecuador, and the potential use of such technology as tools of Chinese intelligence;

(5) Chinese intelligence engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the development of dual-use platforms;

(6) the nature of the People’s Republic of China’s presence in the region, and whether it is competitive, threatening, or benign to the United States national interests; and

(7) Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as well the work in Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

(c) Coordination.—In preparing the report required under subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, as feasible.

(d) Form.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified annexes.

 

SUBTITLE A - INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

 

SEC. 611. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY TO INCREASE ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND PROMOTE THE RULE OF LAW.
(a) Strategy Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of investment, sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) Additional Elements.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include a plan of action to—

(1) assist Latin American and Caribbean countries with the sustainable development of their economies;

(2) promote the rule of law as a means to ensure fair competition, combat corruption, and strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance;

(3) identify and mitigate obstacles to economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) maintain free and transparent access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere; and

(5) facilitate a more competitive environment for United States businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(c) Reporting Requirement.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) on the implementation of this title, including examples of successes and challenges.

SEC. 612. ADVANCING REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS TO PROTECT HOST COUNTRIES’ NATIONAL INTERESTS.
(a) Finding.—Congress finds that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (referred to in this subsection as “CFIUS”), as set forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565)—

(1) protects United States national security interests that are related to foreign direct investment in the United States economy; and

(2) provides a mechanism by which the United States Government can respond to concerns that investments may be driven by political, rather than economic, motives.

(b) In General.—The Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist members of national legislatures and executive branch officials in establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks that are similar to the frameworks set forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565).

(c) Purposes.—In carrying out subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall actively encourage partner governments—

(1) to protect their respective country’s national security interests;

(2) to protect the national security interests of their allies; and

(3) to review and approve, suspend, or prohibit investments and projects, on a case-by-case basis and in the aggregate, to evaluate and assess their potential risk to such national security interests.

(d) Diplomatic Engagement.—In providing the technical assistance described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with legislators from countries vital to the interests of the United States to encourage them to adopt legislation described in subsections (b) and (c) to regulate infrastructure development projects

(e) Strategy.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsections (b) through (d) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(f) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the activities described in subsections (b) through (d) and the strategy submitted under subsection (e) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(g) Authorization Of Appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 to carry out the activities set forth in subsections (b) through (d).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)) and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund under section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h), to the extent that such funds are expended.

SEC. 613. STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT SELECTION AND PROCUREMENT PROCESSES.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Corruption, as evidenced by the Odebrecht construction scandal and the Panama Papers, creates significant obstacles to doing business in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) China further exacerbates the levels of corruption in the region by engaging in corrupt practices when pursuing secure infrastructure contracts and procurement agreements.

(3) Procurement agreements not based exclusively on cost, quality, and necessity can lead to projects that do not serve the best interests of the public.

(b) Engagement Initiatives.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Director of the United States Trade Development Agency, and representatives of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, shall plan and carry out initiatives to engage with governments in Latin America and the Caribbean for the purpose of strengthening infrastructure project selection processes and procurement processes, including—

(1) discussing, devising, and disseminating best practices, frameworks, and tools that—

(A) ensure greater adherence to the rule of law;

(B) promote greater transparency in infrastructure, trade, and development projects; and

(C) more effectively regulate tender processes to minimize opportunities for corrupt practices;

(2) strengthening legal structures as needed to ensure business agreements are transparent, clear, and enforceable;

(3) increasing the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean governments to effectively assess and negotiate investment opportunities in accordance with applicable laws, including commercial and public infrastructure projects;

(4) promoting legislation that codifies best practices in applying the rule of law to infrastructure, trade, and development projects;

(5) promoting the adoption of infrastructure project selection processes that include environmental impact studies that prioritize minimal environmental impact, strong environmental standards, and social safeguards for vulnerable and marginalized populations, including indigenous and Afro-Latino populations;

(6) emphasizing differences in business practices between the United States and China, particularly those relating to the rule of law, transparency, and financing; and

(7) fostering and enabling economic and technical data sharing relating to contract costs, structuring, and terms, including loan terms, cost overruns, and quality assurance, among regional governments and the United States.

(c) Consultation.—During the planning of the initiatives described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Director of the United States Trade Development Agency’s Global Procurement Initiative, and representatives of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, shall consult with representatives of the private sector and nongovernmental organizations in the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

(d) Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the initiatives described in subsection (b) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(e) Baseline Assessment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the congressional committees referred to in subsection (d) that assesses, based on credible indices of the performance of the rule of law (including the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index), the progress made by Latin American and Caribbean governments toward strengthening the rule of law, reducing corruption, and creating greater transparency in business practices, including through—

(1) standardizing and regulating procurement practices; and

(2) streamlining, modernizing, and digitizing records for public procurement and customs duties.

(f) Authorization Of Appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2023, $5,000,000 to carry out the activities set forth in subsections (b) and (c).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)) to the extent that such funds are expended.

SEC. 614. PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN DIGITAL GOVERNANCE.
(a) Sense Of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that United States engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean regarding digital infrastructure and security should—

(1) help protect privacy, civil liberties, and human rights; and

(2) strengthen institutions aimed at fighting cybercrimes.

(b) In General.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Department of Justice, shall conduct diplomatic engagement to encourage and facilitate Latin American and Caribbean governments’ adoption of standards to address cybercrimes, such as institutionalizing the recommendations of the Organization of American States Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas Working Group on Cybercrime (December 2016: OEA/Ser. K/XXXIV), including—

(1) adopting or updating procedural measures and legislation necessary to ensure the collection and safe custody of all forms of electronic evidence and their admissibility in criminal proceedings and trials and to enable States to assist one another in matters involving electronic evidence, with due regard for rights to privacy and due process;

(2) developing and implementing national strategies to deter, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime as part of a broader and more coordinated effort to protect the information technology systems and networks of citizens, businesses, and governments;

(3) continuing to develop partnerships among Latin American and Caribbean officials responsible for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting such crimes, and the private sector, in order to streamline and improve the procurement of information in the context of mutual assistance proceedings; and

(4) working, in cooperation with like-minded democracies in international organizations, to advance standards for digital governance and promote a free and open internet.

(c) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the date that is 5 years after such date of enactment, the Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the diplomatic engagement described in subsection (b).

SEC. 615. INVESTING IN PROJECTS THAT STRENGTHEN THE REGION’S DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) According to a 2016 report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Working Paper No. 334: Harnessing the Digital Economy for Developing Countries”—

(A) the digital economy fosters growth and productivity and supports inclusive development by improving accessibility for previously marginalized groups;

(B) access to digital infrastructure can provide these groups with a whole range of markets and services, including education, peer-to-peer lending, e-government, the sharing economy, crowdfunding, and online job matching services; and

(C) adoption and usage of digital technologies raises the productivity of capital and labor, enables the participation in global value chains, and contributes to greater inclusion by lowering transaction costs and expanding access to information.

(2) According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the combination of high rates of financial exclusion and high mobile penetration and technological innovation represents a great opportunity to use technology to enable financial services to reach a part of the population in Latin America that has been underserved by traditional financial services.

(b) Digital Infrastructure Access And Security Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to Congress a strategy and implementation plan for leveraging United States expertise to help Latin American and Caribbean governments—

(1) develop and secure their digital infrastructure;

(2) protect technological assets, including data privacy;

(3) advance cybersecurity to protect against cybercrime and cyberespionage; and

(4) create more equal access to economic opportunities for their citizens.

(c) Challenges.—The strategy described in subsection (b) shall address—

(1) the severe digital divides between more wealthy urban centers and rural districts;

(2) the need for protection of citizens’ privacy; and

(3) the need to expand existing initiatives to allow public-private partnerships to increase access to micro-grids and decentralized electronic systems.

(d) Consultation.—In creating the strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with—

(1) leaders of the United States telecommunication industry;

(2) other technology experts from nongovernmental organizations and academia; and

(3) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies.

(e) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the date that is 5 years after such date of enactment, the Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the implementation of the strategy described in subsection (b).

SEC. 616. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES IN THE AMERICAS.
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist members of national legislatures and executive branch officials in establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks that are similar to those set forth in—

(1) section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78dd–1); and

(2) section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd–2).

(b) Purposes.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall actively encourage partner governments—

(1) to adopt standards similar to those in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (title I of Public Law 95–213) that deter fraudulent business practices and increase government and private sector accountability in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(2) to strengthen the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of government institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean to combat fraudulent business practices involving public officials.

(c) Strategy Requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) and (b) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(d) Consultation.—In formulating the strategy described in subsection (c), the Secretary of State shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.

(e) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the date that is 5 years after such date of enactment, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the activities described in subsections (a) and (b) and the strategy submitted under subsection (c) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(f) Authorization Of Appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 to the Department of State for fiscal year 2023—

(A) to carry out the activities set forth in subsections (a) and (b); and

(B) to develop the strategy submitted under subsection (c).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)) and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund under section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h), to the extent that such funds are expended.

SEC. 617. COUNTERING MALIGN BUSINESS PRACTICES.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) China has demonstrated a pattern of exploiting international norms and domestic laws in foreign states to its benefit, while ignoring such laws and norms when they interfere with China’s perceived national interests.

(2) China has demonstrated a pattern of bribing foreign government officials to ensure that it receives favorable terms on infrastructure deals and overstates the benefits or underplays the risks of proposed infrastructure projects.

(b) Aliens Ineligible For Visas, Admission, Or Parole.—An alien described in this subsection is an alien whom the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of either Secretary) knows, or has reason to believe, is engaging or has engaged in acts of significant corruption in a country in Latin America or the Caribbean with representatives of, or on behalf of, the Government of China, a Chinese state-owned entity, or a Chinese private sector entity.

(c) Visas, Admission, Or Parole.—An alien described in subsection (b) is—

(1) inadmissible to the United States;

(2) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(3) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(d) Current Visas Revoked.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subsection (b) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(2) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under paragraph (1)—

(A) shall take effect immediately; and

(B) shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.

(e) Exceptions.—Sanctions under subsections (c) and (d) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—

(1) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(2) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(f) National Security.—The President may waive the application of this section with respect to an alien if the President—

(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(2) submits a notice of, and justification for, such waiver to the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 618. PROMOTING GREATER ENERGY SECURITY.
(a) Policy Statement.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) achieve greater energy security; and

(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels.

(b) Strategy Requirement.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for regional cooperation with Caribbean countries—

(1) to lower the region’s dependence on imported fuels, grow the region’s domestic energy production for the generation of electricity, and strengthen regional energy security;

(2) to lower the region’s dependence on oil in the transportation sector;

(3) to increase the region’s energy efficiency, energy conservation, and investment in alternatives to imported fuels;

(4) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity transmission networks;

(5) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand community and individuals’ access to electricity; and

(6) to help reform the region’s energy markets to encourage good regulatory governance and to promote a climate of private sector investment.

(c) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (b) shall include—

(1) a thorough review and inventory of United States Government activities to promote energy security in the Caribbean region and to reduce the region’s reliance on oil for electricity generation that are being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with multilateral institutions;

(2) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation—

(A) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small size of Caribbean energy markets;

(B) to address the high transportation and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean countries;

(C) to ensure greater donor coordination between governments, multilateral institutions, multilateral banks, and private investors; and

(D) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(3) measures to encourage each Caribbean government to ensure that it has—

(A) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;

(B) affordable access by third-party investors to its electrical grid with minimal regulatory interference;

(C) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;

(D) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;

(E) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;

(F) cost-reflective tariffs; and

(G) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions; and

(4) recommendations for how United States policy, technical, and economic assistance can be used in the Caribbean region—

(A) to advance renewable energy development and the incorporation of renewable technologies into existing energy grids and the development and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate and feasible;

(B) to create regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(C) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help attract private investment and break down any market or regulatory barriers; and

(D) to establish a mechanism for each host government to have access to independent legal advice—

(i) to speed the development of energy-related contracts; and

(ii) to better protect the interests of Caribbean governments and their citizens.

 

SUBTITLE B - PROMOTING REGIONAL SECURITY AND DIGITAL SECURITY, AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS

 

SEC. 621. ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF TELECOM AND DATA NETWORKS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Sense Of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) allegations of espionage, intellectual property theft, hacking, and unscrupulous business practices often accompany the entrance of Chinese companies into a region;

(2) the United States Government should assist Latin American and Caribbean governments and businesses in developing their own digital telecommunications networks to render them less susceptible to Chinese malfeasance; and

(3) strengthening and implementing intellectual property and cyber governance laws will boost innovation in the Latin America and the Caribbean.

(b) Technical Assistance.—The Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues of the Department of State, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chief of the International Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission shall offer to provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen their capacity to promote digital security, including—

(1) defending the integrity of digital infrastructure and digital assets, including data storage systems, such as Cloud computing, proprietary data, personal information, and proprietary technologies;

(2) detecting, identifying, and investigating cybercrimes, including the collection of digital forensic evidence;

(3) developing appropriate enforcement mechanisms for cybercrimes;

(4) detecting and identifying perpetrators; and

(5) prosecuting cybercrimes and holding perpetrators accountable for such crimes.

(c) Prioritization.—The Secretary of State, in providing the technical assistance described in subsection (b), shall prioritize working with national and regional law enforcement entities, including—

(1) police forces;

(2) public prosecutors;

(3) attorneys general

(4) courts; and

(5) other law enforcement and civilian intelligence entities, as appropriate.

(d) Cyber Defense Assistance.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and the Director of National Intelligence, shall offer to provide technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean—

(1) to protect the integrity of their telecom and data networks and their critical infrastructure;

(2) to build and monitor secure telecom and data networks;

(3) to identify cyber threats and detect and deter cyber attacks;

(4) to investigate cyber crimes, including the collection of digital forensic evidence;

(5) to protect the integrity of digital infrastructure and digital assets, including data storage systems (including Cloud computing), proprietary data, personal information, and proprietary technologies;

(6) to plan maintenance, improvements, and modernization in a coordinated and regular fashion so as to ensure continuity and safety; and

(7) to protect the digital systems that manage roads, bridges, ports, and transportation hubs.

(e) Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the technical assistance described in subsection (b) and (d) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 622. ADDRESSING THE RISKS THAT PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES POSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) According to a 2018 report by Freedom House—

(A) China has stepped up efforts to use digital media to increase its own power, both inside and outside of China;

(B) in 2018, for the second year in a row, China was the worst abuser of internet freedom, and during that year, the Government of China hosted media officials from dozens of countries for 2- and 3-week seminars on its sprawling system of censorship and surveillance;

(C) Chinese companies have supplied telecommunications hardware, advanced facial-recognition technology, and data analytics tools to a variety of governments with poor human rights records, which could benefit Chinese intelligence services and repressive local authorities; and

(D) China’s Belt and Road Initiative includes a “Digital Silk Road” of Chinese-built fiber-optic networks that could expose internet traffic to greater monitoring by local and Chinese intelligence agencies, given that China is determined to set the technical standards for how the next generation of traffic is coded and transmitted.

(2) As part of its engagement with Latin American and Caribbean governments, China has begun promoting the installation of pervasive surveillance camera systems, under the pretext of citizen security, in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, to be financed, designed, installed, and maintained by companies linked to the Government of China.

(b) Sense Of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and

(2) the adoption of surveillance systems can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations of civil rights, and harassment of political opponents.

(c) Diplomatic Engagement.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments in Latin America and the Caribbean—

(1) to help officials identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by pervasive surveillance and monitoring technologies; and

(2) to offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.

(d) Internet Freedom Programs.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s office of Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists and citizens in Latin America, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information without fear of repercussions or surveillance.

(e) Support For Civil Society.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations—

(1) to support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) to protect open, secure, and reliable access to the internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) to provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) to train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere; and

(5) to assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics.

(f) Briefing Requirement.—Not more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(g) Authorization Of Appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2023 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (e).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from—

(A) the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)); and

(B) the Development Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2413(a)).

SEC. 623. REVITALIZING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAMS.
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall dedicate not less than 17 percent of the amounts appropriated to bilateral and multilateral military education programs, such as the International Military Education and Training program, for Latin America and the Caribbean during the 5-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Modernization.—The Secretary of State shall take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under subsection (a)—

(1) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

(c) Required Elements.—The programs referred to under subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;

(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—

(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and

(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization; and

(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, democracy, and civilian control.

(d) Limitation.—Security assistance under this section is subject to the limitations set forth in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

 

SUBTITLE C - ADVANCING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

 

SEC. 631. COUNTERACTING GROWING CHINESE EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Finding.—According to a report by the National Endowment for Democracy—

(1) China has spent the equivalent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the world through thousands of people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, educational programs, and the development of media enterprises and information initiatives with global reach;

(2) the aim of Chinese influence efforts is intended to distract and manipulate the political and information environments in targeted countries; and

(3) the countries most vulnerable to Chinese efforts are those in which democratic institutions are weak.

(b) Sense Of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that China’s efforts to mold public opinion and influence educational institutions on the issues described in subsection (a) undermines United States influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and threaten democratic institutions and practices in the region.

(c) Strategy.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency for International Development, shall devise a strategy—

(1) to expand existing programs and, as necessary, design and implement educational, professional, and cultural exchanges and other programs to create and sustain mutual understanding with other countries necessary to advance United States foreign policy goals by cultivating people-to-people ties among current and future global leaders that build enduring networks and personal relationships and promote United States national security and values, including the expansion of exchange visitor programs, such as international visitor leadership programs and professional capacity building programs that prioritize building skills in entrepreneurship, promoting transparency, and technology;

(2) to expand and strengthen existing programs, and, as necessary, design and implement basic and higher education programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the United States Strategy on International Basic Education and the United States Agency for International Development Education Policy, to enable all young adults, youth, and children to acquire the quality education and skills needed to be productive members in society, which will lead to better health, economic growth, a sustainable environment, and peaceful, democratic societies;

(3) to dedicate not less than 18 percent of the budget of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State to carry out the activities described in paragraph (1); and

(4) to dedicate not less than 8 percent of the budget of the Education Office of the United States Agency for International Development to carry out the activities described in paragraph (2).

(d) Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency for International Development shall provide a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsection (c) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 632. ADVANCING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs, and the Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center, shall expand existing initiatives and, as necessary, develop and implement new initiatives that facilitate and strengthen the capacity of civil society and independent media outlets to increase transparency and accountability among government and business leaders.

(b) Program Elements.—The initiatives under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;

(2) training on investigative reporting relating to incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and commercial practices, including the role of the Government of China in such practices;

(3) training on investigative reporting relating to efforts the use of misinformation, disinformation, and state media to influence public opinion in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the role of the Government of China in such practices; and

(4) assistance for nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraphs (2) and (3).

(c) Consultation.—In developing and implementing the initiatives under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with—

(1) nongovernmental organizations focused on transparency and combating corruption, such as Transparency International, the Latin American and Caribbean chapters of Transparency International, and similar organizations; and

(2) media organizations that promote investigative journalism and train organizations in investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability, such as ProPublica, the Center for Public Integrity, and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

(d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the initiatives under subsection (a) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(e) Authorization Of Appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2023 to carry out the initiatives under subsection (a).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to the notification requirements applicable to expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c)) and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund under section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h), to the extent that such funds are expended.

 

SUBTITLE D - RESOURCING FOR SUCCESS

 

SEC. 641. APPOINTMENT OF CHINA ENGAGEMENT OFFICERS AT UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall direct the Chiefs of Mission at United States Embassies and Consulates in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Cuba, to designate a China Engagement Officer, from among existing staff at the Post, to monitor and report on Chinese activities related to diplomatic engagement, economic investment, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, surveillance technology, digital infrastructure, military and security presence and trainings, intelligence activities, educational and cultural exchanges, education, and corruption in the respective countries.

(b) Annual Meeting.—The Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs shall convene an annual meeting (either in person or by video conference call) of all of the China Engagement Officers designated pursuant to subsection (a)—

(1) to discuss and compare developments in their individual countries;

(2) to identify trends in Chinese activities in Latin America and the Caribbean and its subregions; and

(3) to recommend potential strategies to mitigate or compete with Chinese activities in the region.

(c) Briefing Requirement.—Concurrent with the annual meeting described in subsection (b), China Engagement Officers serving in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Cuba, shall brief—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(d) Consultation.—The Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs and the China Engagement Officers designated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be available for consultations with the staff of the congressional committees referred to in subsection (c).

SEC. 642. ASSESSING STAFFING NEEDS AT UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Staffing Assessment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit the assessments and accompanying reports, if necessary, described in subsections (b) and (c) to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b) Foreign Commercial Service Assessment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Commerce shall prepare a written assessment that—

(A) determines whether the current staffing levels of the United States Foreign Commercial Service at all United States embassies, diplomatic, and development offices in Latin America and the Caribbean are sufficient to successfully advance United States economic policy in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(B) specifically details the results for each United States embassy, diplomatic, and development office in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) ACCOMPANYING REPORT.—If the assessment under paragraph (1) reveals insufficient staffing levels, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Commerce shall submit an accompanying report that—

(A) identifies the costs associated with increasing the overseas presence of United States Foreign Commercial Service officers in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(B) includes a timeline and strategy for increasing such staffing levels.

(c) Public Diplomacy Assessment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall prepare a written assessment that—

(A) determines whether the current staffing levels of Foreign Service public diplomacy officers at all United States embassies and diplomatic offices in Latin America and the Caribbean are sufficient—

(i) to successfully advance United States national interests; and

(ii) to counter misinformation and disinformation efforts by the Government of China and the Government of Russia; and

(B) specifically details the results for each United States embassy and diplomatic office in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) ACCOMPANYING REPORT.—If the assessment under paragraph (1) reveals insufficient staffing levels, the Secretary of State shall submit an accompanying report that—

(A) identifies the costs associated with increasing the overseas presence of Foreign Service public diplomacy officers in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(B) includes a timeline and strategy for increasing such staffing levels.

 

TITLE VII

THIS LAND IS OUR LAND

(with special thanks to Josh Hawley of Missouri)

 

SEC. 701. PROHIBITION ON THE PURCHASE OF PUBLIC OR PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL REAL ESTATE LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES BY NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall take such actions as may be necessary to prohibit the purchase of public or private agricultural (including ranching) real estate located in the United States by nonresident aliens, foreign businesses, an agent, trustee, or fiduciary associated with the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Prohibition.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall take such actions as may be necessary to prohibit participation in programs administered by the Secretary of Agriculture by nonresident aliens, foreign businesses, an agent, trustee, or fiduciary associated with the Government of the People’s Republic of China, with the exception for food inspection or other food and safety regulatory requirements.

(c) United States Defined.—The term “United States” means the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

 

TITLE VIII

LEVERAGING DIPLOMATIC POWER TO PROTECT UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS

(with thanks to Mr. Rubio)

 

SEC. 801. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to press for authorities in China to open the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to regular, transparent, and unmanipulated visits by members of the press, Members of Congress, congressional staff delegations, and members and staff of the Congressional-Executive Commission on the People’s Republic of China and the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission;

(2) to strive to ensure the preservation of the distinct ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious groups in the XUAR;

(3) to urge other nations to call for the cessation of all government-sponsored crackdowns, imprisonments, and detentions of people throughout the XUAR aimed at those involved in the peaceful expression of their ethnic, cultural, political, or religious identity;

(4) to commend countries that have provided shelter and hospitality to Uyghurs in exile, including Turkey, Albania, and Germany; and

(5) to urge countries with sizeable Muslim populations, given commonalities in their religious and cultural identities, to demonstrate concern over the plight of Uyghurs.

 

SEC. 802. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD WITH RESPECT TO THE UYGHUR SITUATION.

(a) In General.—The Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, shall support, through the United States Speaker Program, human rights advocates representing Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious groups persecuted in the PRC, to speak at public diplomacy forums in Muslim-majority countries and other regions about issues regarding the human rights and religious freedom of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious groups that are being persecuted in the PRC.

 

(b) Consultation Requirement.—The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs shall consult with representatives of the global Uyghur community when selecting participants for the activity described in subsection (a).

 

(c) Media Activities.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media should facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information to Muslim-majority countries about issues regarding the human rights and religious freedom of Uyghurs and members of other groups in the XUAR.

 

SEC. 803. STRATEGY TO INCREASE ACCESS TO DETENTION FACILITIES AND PRISONS AND SECURE THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS.

(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to Congress a strategy to support and secure the release of political prisoners detained in the PRC.

 

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a detailed description of how the United States Government can pressure the PRC to immediately close all detention facilities and “political reeducation” camps housing Uyghurs and members of other ethnic minority groups in the XUAR;

(2) a detailed assessment of how the United States can leverage its contributions to the United Nations to support the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights and numerous United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ urgent calls for immediate and unhindered access to detention facilities and “political reeducation” camps in the XUAR by independent international organizations and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for a comprehensive assessment of the human rights situation;

(3) a detailed description of how the United States Government will work with other like-minded countries to pressure the PRC to immediately stop the genocide of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the XUAR; and

(4) a detailed plan for how United States Government officials can use meetings with representatives of the Chinese Communist Party to demand the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners detained for their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities, or for expressing their political or religious beliefs in the XUAR.

 

(c) Form.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

 

SEC. 804. REQUIREMENT FOR UYGHUR LANGUAGE TRAINING.

The Secretary of State shall ensure that—

(1) Uyghur language training is available to Foreign Service officers, as appropriate; and

(2) every effort is being made to ensure that a Uyghur-speaking member of the Foreign Service (as described in section 103 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3903)) is assigned to United States diplomatic and consular missions in the PRC, Turkey, and other nations hosting Uyghur populations.

 

SEC. 805. UYGHUR CONSIDERATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

The Secretary of State and the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations—

(1) to oppose any efforts—

(A) to prevent consideration of the issues related to the XUAR in any body of the United Nations; and

(B) to prevent the participation of any Uyghur human rights advocates in nongovernmental fora hosted by or otherwise organized under the auspices of any body of the United Nations; and

(2) to support the appointment of a special rapporteur or working group for the XUAR for the purposes of—

(A) monitoring human rights violations and abuses in the XUAR; and

(B) making reports available to the High Commissioner for Refugees, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the General Assembly, and other United Nations bodies.

 

TITLE IX

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP TO PROTECT UYGHUR REFUGEES

(with thanks to Mr. Coons)

 

SEC. 901. DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

(a) In General.—Persons of special humanitarian concern eligible for Priority 2 processing under the refugee resettlement priority system shall include—

(1) Uyghurs and members of other predominately Turkic or Muslim ethnic groups, including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, who are residents of, or fled from, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and who suffered persecution or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their imputed or actual religious or ethnic identity;

(2) Uyghurs and members of other predominately Turkic or Muslim ethnic groups, including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, who have been formally charged, detained, or convicted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on account of their peaceful actions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as described in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145); and

(3) the spouses, children, and parents (as such terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals described in paragraph (1) or (2), except such parents who are citizens of a country other than the People’s Republic of China.

 

(b) Processing Of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Refugees.—The processing of individuals described in subsection (a) for classification as refugees may occur in China or in another foreign country.

 

(c) Eligibility For Admission As Refugees.—An alien may not be denied the opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee under this section primarily because such alien—

(1) qualifies as an immediate relative of a citizen of the United States; or

(2) is eligible for admission to the United States under any other immigrant classification.

 

(d) Facilitation Of Admissions.—Certain applicants for admission to the United States from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region may not be denied primarily on the basis of a politically motivated arrest, detention, or other adverse government action taken against such applicant as a result of the participation by such applicant in religious, cultural, or protest activities.

 

(e) Bilateral Diplomacy.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize bilateral diplomacy with foreign countries hosting former residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region who face significant diplomatic pressure from the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

 

(f) Exclusion From Numerical Limitations.—Aliens eligible for Priority 2 processing under this section who are provided refugee status shall not be counted against any numerical limitation under section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).

 

(g) Reporting Requirements.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly submit a report containing the matters described in paragraph (2) to—

(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) the total number of applications from individuals described in subsection (a) that are pending at the end of the reporting period;

(B) the average wait-times and the number of such applicants who, at the end of the reporting period, are waiting for—

(i) a prescreening interview with a resettlement support center;

(ii) an interview with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;

(iii) the completion of security checks; or

(iv) receipt of a final decision after completion of an interview with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

(C) the number of individuals who applied for refugee status under this section whose application was denied, disaggregated by the reason for each such denial.

(3) FORM.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(4) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of State shall make each report submitted under this subsection available to the public on the internet website of the Department of State.

 

(h) Satisfaction Of Other Requirements.—Aliens eligible under this section for Priority 2 processing under the refugee resettlement priority system shall be considered to satisfy the requirements under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) for admission to the United States.

 

SEC. 902. WAIVER OF IMMIGRANT STATUS PRESUMPTION.

(a) In General.—The presumption under the first sentence of section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(b)) that every alien is an immigrant until the alien establishes that the alien is entitled to nonimmigrant status shall not apply to an alien described in subsection (b).

 

(b) Alien Described.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), an alien described in this subsection is an alien who—

(A) (i) is an Uyghur or a member of another predominately Turkic or Muslim ethnic group, including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and was a resident of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on January 1, 2021; or

(ii) fled the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region after June 30, 2009, and resides in a different province of China or in another foreign country;

(B) is seeking entry to the United States to apply for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158); and

(C) is facing repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by the Government of the People’s Republic of China including—

(i) forced and arbitrary detention including in internment and reeducation camps;

(ii) forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms;

(iii) forced labor;

(iv) forced separation from family members; or

(v) other forms of systemic threats, harassment, and gross human rights violations.

(2) EXCLUSION.—An alien described in this subsection does not include any alien who—

(A) is a citizen or permanent resident of a country other than the People’s Republic of China; or

(B) is determined to have committed a gross violation of human rights.

 

(c) Intention To Abandon Foreign Residence.—The filing by an alien described in subsection (b) of an application for a preference status under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) or otherwise seeking permanent residence in the United States shall not be deemed as evidence of the alien’s intention to abandon a foreign residence for purposes of obtaining a visa as a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (H)(i)(b), (H)(i)(c), (L), or (V) of section 101(a)(15) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) or otherwise obtaining or maintaining the status of a nonimmigrant described in any such subparagraph if the alien had obtained a change of status under section 208 of such Act to a classification as such a nonimmigrant before the alien’s most recent departure from the United States.

 

SEC. 903. REFUGEE AND ASYLUM DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.

(a) Persecution On Account Of Political, Religious, Or Cultural Expression Or Association.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—An alien who is within a category of aliens established under this Act may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157), that the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution.

(2) NATIONALS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—For purposes of refugee determinations under this Act in accordance with section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157), a national of the People’s Republic of China whose residency in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or any other area within the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, as determined by the Secretary of State, is revoked for having submitted to any United States Government agency a nonfrivolous application for refugee status, asylum, or any other immigration benefit under the immigration laws shall be considered to have suffered persecution on account of political opinion.

 

(b) Changed Circumstances.—For purposes of asylum determinations under this Act in accordance with section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), the revocation of the citizenship, nationality, or residency of an individual for having submitted to any United States Government agency a nonfrivolous application for refugee status, asylum, or any other immigration benefit under the immigration laws shall be considered to be changed circumstances under subsection (a)(2)(D) of such section.

 

SEC. 904. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODATIONS.

It is the policy of the United States to encourage allies and partners of the United States to make accommodations similar to the accommodations made under this Act for Uyghurs and members of other predominately Turkic or Muslim ethnic groups, including Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, who were previously residents of the XUAR and are fleeing oppression by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

 

SEC. 905. SUNSET CLAUSE.

This Title shall cease to have effect on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

Quote

PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY

Supports U.S. economic engagement and diplomatic presence in Latin American and Caribbean countries and implements requirements to counter foreign corrupt practices and malign business practices in the region. Specifically, via establishing measures to (1) increase U.S. economic competitiveness and promote the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, (2) promote regional security and digital security, and (3) protect human rights in the Americas and advance the role of civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean.

This bill requires the President to prohibit nonresident aliens, foreign businesses, and agents associated with China's government from (1) purchasing agricultural (including ranching) real estate located in the United States, or (2) participating in Department of Agriculture programs that are unrelated to food and safety regulatory requirements.

This title requires the Department of State to take various actions concerning the treatment of Uyghurs and other minority groups in China. For example, the title requires the State Department to (1) support human rights advocates representing such groups speaking at public diplomacy forums, including in Muslim-majority countries; (2) ensure that Uyghur language training is available to Foreign Service officers; and (3) support the appointment of a special rapporteur or working group at the United Nations to monitor and report on human rights violations and abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China.

This bill designates certain residents of the Xinjiang region in China as prioritized refugees of special humanitarian concern and addresses other related issues.

This priority designation shall apply to Uyghurs and members of other predominately Turkic or Muslim ethnic groups (and the spouses, children, and parents of such individuals) who (1) reside in or fled Xinjiang and who suffered persecution on account of their religious or ethnic identity, or have a well-founded fear of such persecution; or (2) have been formally charged, detained, or convicted for certain peaceful actions related to Xinjiang. Such an individual may not be denied admission into the United States based primarily on an arrest or other adverse government action due to that individual's participation in religious, cultural, or protest activities.

The bill also waives certain immigration-related requirements for such individuals.

Furthermore, a Chinese national seeking refugee status shall be considered to have been persecuted on account of political opinion if the Chinese government revoked that individual's residency in any region of China because the individual submitted a nonfrivolous application for a U.S. immigration benefit.

Similarly, if the Chinese government revoked a Chinese national's citizenship, nationality, or residency because that individual filed for a U.S. immigration benefit, that revocation shall constitute a changed circumstance. (Among other things, a changed circumstance may allow an individual who has been rejected for asylum to apply again.)

 

CS

Name: Daniel Fisk

Party: Republican Party

Position: Ex Officio Member

On 1/9/2023 at 9:59 PM, Recks said:

Name: Daniel Fisk

Party: Republican

Position: Ex officio

 

Confirming for the new Congress.

President of the Senate Bu,

Senate Majority Leader Reed,

Acting Senior PPT Du Pont,

 

On behalf of the Republican Party, I name the following members to the Select Committee on Intelligence:

• Senator Hartfield of Nebraska as Ranking Member @Vesica
• Senator Eden of North Carolina as Member @Macmillan
• Minority Leader Fisk of Nebraska as Ex Officio Member @Recks

 

Signed,

Daniel Fisk

Senate Minority Leader

Name: Daniel Fisk (R-NE)

Media/Outlet: CNN 

Reason: Cabinet Concerns and No Votes

• Senate Republicans and I expeditiously approved the vast majority of President Mulroney's cabinet picks - including his national security team - with the Senate only holding full hearings into three of the more questionable nominees.
• But Andy Byford, Scott Wiener, and Heather McTeer Toney all raised questions that needed to be answered. Unfortunately, the questions almost exclusively came from Senate Republicans - with only two of my Democratic colleagues even showing up for the hearings. I personally did my due diligence to ask questions, but the responses were delayed in coming and, in a couple of cases, I was denied the chance to ask follow-ups before time had expired.
• I voted against these three nominees - despite voting for the remainder of President Mulroney's cabinet - because each of these three raised serious doubts in my mind. Whether it was Andy Byford jumping from job-to-job and not holding American citizenship, or Scott Wiener's lack of executive leadership prior to being tapped to run a multi-billion dollar agency, these questions were never resolved.
• My no votes aren't intended as a rebuke of the White House, but rather a suggestion to the new President to have the Senate Democrats work with us, not shut down hearings and run out the clock. Because good ideas can, and do, come from both sides of the aisle.

Fisk Votes Against "Unqualified, Partisan" Cabinet Picks

 

 

WASHINGTON, DC -- Senate Minority Leader Daniel Fisk (R-NE) recently spoke to a press gaggle about his votes against three of President Robert Mulroney's picks for the Cabinet. "I took the time to ask real, hard-hitting questions of the three cabinet picks - for Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and the Environmental Protection Agency - who stood out the most as uniquely unqualified or hyper-partisan," Senator Fisk told the reporters on Capitol Hill. "And in each case, their responses were underwhelming and gave me no real confidence in their ability to lead major agencies." Fisk then focused on Transportation nominee Andy Byford, echoing comments he had previously made via Twitter: "He's not an American citizen, he has no experience to speak of when it comes to road infrastructure management, and he has moved from job-to-job-to-job over the past decade. None of these features give me confidence that he'll uphold his oath of office, that he'd be able to oversee traditional forms of transportation, or that he'll stick around to finish the job under the Mulroney administration."

 

Senator Fisk then spoke about HUD nominee Scott Wiener, a California state senator who has no executive experience. "Scott Wiener is not only radical in his approach to housing policy, calling for more federally-funded housing in urban centers, calling for forcing landlords to accept federal payment, and refusing to call out rent controls - he's also woefully unprepared to lead our nation's next phase of building a homeownership society." Finally, Minority Leader Fisk spoke about Heather McTeer Toney, President Mulroney's pick to lead the EPA: "The EPA Administrator must not write regulations in the 'gray areas,' but should only enforce what Congress has explicitly handed down to her agency. I am not convinced Mrs. Toney would stay in the lines and am concerned for our energy future that she would erect walls of red tape." Senator Fisk, who has been vocal in his desire to see more questions, also briefly mentioned the Senate Democrats refusing to allow a vote on his duly-seconded effort to allow for an extension of the hearings. "Instead, they are trying to rush these unqualified and partisan nominees through the process as quickly as possible - even despite the Senate Republicans expeditiously supporting the majority of the Mulroney administration's choices."

Nay.

Nay.

Nay.

Nay.

Nay.

Aye.

Aye.

Nay.

Nay.