CLASSIFIED: Briefing to the Senate on Russian Election Interference

[Tedder]

Introduction

Good afternoon, members of the Senate. I am Philip Zelikow, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. At the request of the President, I am here today to provide a classified briefing on the recent Russian interference in the French election and the implications for the United States.

Overview of Russian Interference in the French Election

Our intelligence confirms substantial interference by Russian operatives in the most recent French election. The tactics employed by Russia included:

1. Disinformation Campaigns:

   • Russian entities systematically created and disseminated false news stories and misleading information. The goal was to manipulate public opinion and create divisions among the French electorate.
   • These disinformation campaigns were sophisticated, utilizing social media platforms and other digital channels to amplify their reach and impact.

2. Cyber Attacks:

   • There were targeted cyber attacks on critical election infrastructure, including the hacking of emails from political candidates and parties.
   • Sensitive information was then leaked to the public to undermine trust in the electoral process and the legitimacy of the candidates.

Implications for the United States

Our investigations reveal that Russia has employed similar tactics against the United States. Key findings include:

1. Unwitting Collaboration:

   • Several American individuals and organizations unwittingly amplified Russian disinformation by sharing and promoting false information originating from Russian sources.
   • These actions were primarily due to a lack of awareness about the origins and intentions behind the disinformation campaigns.

2. Questionable Contacts:

   • Instances of questionable contacts between Russian operatives and a few American political figures were uncovered. While these contacts did not amount to direct collusion, they raised serious concerns about potential influence and manipulation.
   • The individuals involved were primarily mid-level staffers and elected officials. Most were unaware of the Russian agenda and cooperated fully with our investigation. However, a few outliers did not cooperate, though they appear to be unwitting pawns rather than active collaborators.

Recommendations for the Senate

Given these findings, we recommend the following actions to safeguard our electoral processes:

1. Enhanced Cybersecurity Measures:

   • We must strengthen cybersecurity across all levels of election infrastructure to protect against hacking and cyber threats.
   • Increased funding for cybersecurity initiatives is essential to ensure continuous updates and improvements.

2. Public Awareness and Education:

   • Launching comprehensive public awareness campaigns to educate citizens about the risks and signs of disinformation is crucial.
   • Media literacy programs should be promoted to help the public discern credible sources of information.

3. Bipartisan Cooperation:

   • Establish a bipartisan task force to oversee the implementation of election security measures and monitor potential threats.
   • Greater collaboration between federal, state, and local authorities is necessary for a unified and effective response.

4. Legislative Actions:

   • Consider legislation that mandates transparency for online political advertisements to ensure clarity on who is funding and distributing these ads.
   • Strengthen laws against foreign interference and impose stricter penalties for individuals and entities that collaborate with foreign actors.

Conclusion

The integrity of our elections is vital to our democracy. The recent interference in the French elections underscores the ongoing threats posed by foreign actors like Russia. By taking proactive measures and fostering a united front, we can protect our electoral processes and uphold the principles of our democracy.

 

Thank you for your attention. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have. If 24 hours pass without a question being asked, this briefing will conclude.

 

@Tuna

[TexAgRepublican]

Director,

 

Can you provide us with some specific evidence of these charges? Names, places, dates, etc. Just so we have a better idea of what exactly is going on and the context. 

[Tedder]

8 minutes ago, TexAgRepublican said:

Director,

 

Can you provide us with some specific evidence of these charges? Names, places, dates, etc. Just so we have a better idea of what exactly is going on and the context. 

 

Senator Van Horn, thank you for your question. I understand the need for specific evidence to grasp the gravity and context of the situation. Here are some specific instances and details of Russian interference activities:

1. Disinformation Campaigns:

   • Incident: During the French election, numerous false news articles were circulated claiming that candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon had secret ties to foreign governments and offshore accounts.
   • Dates: These articles surfaced in the weeks leading up to the election, particularly in April and May 2017.
   • Sources: The articles were traced back to Russian-controlled social media accounts and websites.

2. Cyber Attacks:

   • Incident: The emails of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's campaign team were hacked, resulting in the leak of thousands of documents just days before the election.
   • Date: The hacking and subsequent leaks occurred in early May 2017.
   • Method: The cyber attacks were executed using phishing emails to gain access to the campaign’s email accounts. The techniques used bore the hallmarks of known Russian hacking groups such as APT28 (Fancy Bear).

3. Unwitting Collaboration in the United States:

   • Incident: Several American social media influencers and bloggers unwittingly shared and promoted disinformation originating from Russian sources.
   • Names: Notable examples include influencers who shared articles from the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a known Russian troll farm.
   • Dates: These activities were particularly prominent during the 2016 U.S. election and continue into the 2018 midterm election cycle.
   • Content: The disinformation often revolved around polarizing social and political issues, including immigration and racial tensions.

4. Questionable Contacts:

   • Incident: Russian operatives attempted to establish contacts with several mid-level staffers and elected officials. They generally seemed to have more success with local and state officials.
   • Names: For confidentiality reasons, I can provide names in a more secure setting, but examples include outreach to campaign staffers from both major political parties.
   • Dates: These contacts were made primarily in 2016 and 2017.
   • Nature of Contacts: These included invitations to events, offers of information on political opponents, and attempts to build relationships that could be exploited later.

[TexAgRepublican]

Thank you. The implication of course when you refer to "Russian operatives" and "Russia" is that these activities are either directly or indirectly authorized by the Russian Government. Is there any hard evidence that connects these sources to the Russian Government? Especially things like the social media accounts and websites posting news articles. I mean we have conspiracy theorists here at home that post all sorts of crazy stuff online. And I guess that brings me to my second point, which is how exactly do we prioritze the threat here? The cyber stuff worries me some. Plus, it's not just elections we have to worry about there. People all over the world are using ransomware. I know in the past there's been rumors of Fancy Bear being a GRU asset, do you have any new intel on that? 

 

But regarding misinformation, I'm not really sure about the best way to handle that. One person's "disinformation" or "conspiracy theory" might be be someone else's legitimate beliefs. You're starting to tread into First Amendment territory it seems like, and all of a sudden we're labeling anything we disagree with as disinformation in an attempt to discredit it. 

[alaskancrabpuffs21]

First, Thank You Director for being here,

 

My question is this. Have we received any undeniable proof that these same actors are looking to influence future elections here in the United States? If so what is the CIA doing to potentially prevent this influence from happening?

Edited June 20 by alaskancrabpuffs21

[Tedder]

12 minutes ago, TexAgRepublican said:

Thank you. The implication of course when you refer to "Russian operatives" and "Russia" is that these activities are either directly or indirectly authorized by the Russian Government. Is there any hard evidence that connects these sources to the Russian Government? Especially things like the social media accounts and websites posting news articles. I mean we have conspiracy theorists here at home that post all sorts of crazy stuff online. And I guess that brings me to my second point, which is how exactly do we prioritze the threat here? The cyber stuff worries me some. Plus, it's not just elections we have to worry about there. People all over the world are using ransomware. I know in the past there's been rumors of Fancy Bear being a GRU asset, do you have any new intel on that? 

 

But regarding misinformation, I'm not really sure about the best way to handle that. One person's "disinformation" or "conspiracy theory" might be be someone else's legitimate beliefs. You're starting to tread into First Amendment territory it seems like, and all of a sudden we're labeling anything we disagree with as disinformation in an attempt to discredit it. 

Senator Van Horn, thank you for raising these important points. I will address your questions and concerns regarding the connection to the Russian government, the prioritization of threats, and the handling of disinformation.

Connection to the Russian Government

1. Hard Evidence Linking to the Russian Government:

   • Social Media Accounts and Websites: Our investigations have identified a consistent pattern linking the activities of these accounts to Russian state actors. Many of the accounts and websites were traced back to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is known to be funded by Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin.
   • Cyber Attacks: The methods and tools used in these cyber attacks, such as those by the group APT28 (Fancy Bear), have been consistently linked to the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU. The sophistication of these operations and the resources required strongly indicate state sponsorship.

2. New Intel on Fancy Bear (APT28):

   • Recent intelligence confirms that APT28 continues to operate under the auspices of the GRU. This includes updates to their techniques and targets, indicating an ongoing and adaptive threat to both political and non-political entities worldwide.

Prioritization of the Threat

1. Cybersecurity Threats:

   • Election Security: The immediate priority is to secure our electoral infrastructure from cyber threats. This includes not only preventing hacking but also ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of voter data.
   • Broader Cyber Threats: Beyond elections, the rise of ransomware and other cyber attacks poses a significant threat to our national security and economic stability. We need to invest in robust cybersecurity measures across both public and private sectors to mitigate these risks.

2. Disinformation and Misinformation:

   • First Amendment Considerations: It is crucial to strike a balance between combating disinformation and upholding First Amendment rights. The aim is not to suppress legitimate political discourse but to identify and address malicious foreign influence.
   • Approach to Handling Disinformation:
     • Transparency: Promoting transparency in online political advertisements can help the public better understand the sources of information they encounter.
     • Public Awareness: Educating the public on how to recognize disinformation without impeding free speech is essential. This involves promoting media literacy and critical thinking skills.
     • Collaboration with Tech Companies: Working with social media platforms to develop algorithms and policies that can identify and limit the spread of verified false information while preserving the integrity of free expression.

Conclusion

The threat posed by Russian interference in our elections is multifaceted, involving both direct cyber attacks and more subtle disinformation campaigns. While we must prioritize the protection of our electoral infrastructure, we also need to approach the issue of disinformation with careful consideration of First Amendment rights.

[Tedder]

10 minutes ago, alaskancrabpuffs21 said:

First, Thank You Director for being here,

 

My question is this. Have we received any undeniable proof that these same actors are looking to influence future elections here in the United States? If so what is the CIA doing to potentially prevent this influence from happening?

 

Thank you, Senator Iyal, for your question.

Evidence of Future Influence Attempts

1. Ongoing Activities:

   • Intelligence Reports: Our intelligence has identified ongoing activities by the same actors who interfered in previous elections, indicating that they are indeed preparing to influence future elections in the United States. This includes the continuous monitoring of American social media and the establishment of new disinformation campaigns aimed at the upcoming midterm elections.
   • Cyber Operations: There has been an uptick in reconnaissance activities targeting election-related infrastructure, suggesting preparations for potential cyber attacks similar to those seen in the past.

2. Specific Incidents:

   • Social Media Manipulation: We have detected coordinated efforts to create and spread false narratives about various political candidates and issues, using the same network of social media accounts and websites linked to Russian operatives.
   • Phishing Attempts: There have been numerous phishing attempts targeting political campaigns and election officials, using methods and tools that are consistent with those used by APT28 (Fancy Bear) and other known Russian cyber espionage groups.

Preventative Measures by the CIA

1. Strengthening Cyber Defenses:

   • Collaboration with DHS: We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to strengthen the cybersecurity defenses of election infrastructure at all levels, from federal to local.
   • Advanced Threat Detection: The CIA has implemented advanced threat detection and response systems to identify and neutralize cyber threats in real-time.

2. Public Awareness Campaigns:

   • Educational Initiatives: We are partnering with other government agencies and private organizations to launch public awareness campaigns aimed at educating voters and election officials about the risks and signs of disinformation and cyber threats.
   • Media Literacy Programs: These programs are designed to help the public recognize and critically evaluate information sources, reducing the impact of disinformation.

3. Intelligence Sharing:

   • Interagency Cooperation: We have established robust channels for sharing intelligence with other federal agencies, state governments, and local election officials to ensure they are informed of potential threats and can take appropriate action.
   • International Partnerships: The CIA is also collaborating with international partners to track and counteract foreign influence operations that extend beyond our borders.

4. Counterintelligence Operations:

   • Monitoring and Disruption: We are actively monitoring known operatives and their activities, and we are prepared to disrupt their efforts through coordinated counterintelligence operations.
   • Sanctions and Legal Actions: We are supporting efforts to impose sanctions and pursue legal actions against individuals and entities involved in foreign interference.

 

The threat of foreign interference in our elections remains significant, and the CIA is committed to deploying all available resources to prevent these activities and protect the integrity of our democratic processes. Thank you, Senator Iyal, for your question and your dedication to safeguarding our elections.

[Tedder]

Seeing no additional questions, this briefing is closed and the presiding officer may archive it accordingly. The subject matter discussed here still remains classified, however.